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Abstract:  
 
The notion of neutrality has long been criticised in the mediation literature.  It is often 
said that mediator neutrality is a myth that hides the reality of the impact of the 
mediator on both the content and the process of mediation.  Despite these criticisms 
neutrality continues to be seen as central to mediation theory and to the acceptance of 
mediation as a legitimate, fair and just process.  Internationally, new models of 
mediation are being developed that reject the concept of the neutral mediator.  These 
models base their claim to fairness and legitimacy on being therapeutic in nature, 
valuing relationships highly, and including a multidisciplinary approach to 
understanding conflict and emotion.  In this article we discuss the paradigm of 
therapeutic jurisprudence and its links with new models of mediation, such as the 
story-telling, transformative and narrative models.  We argue that therapeutic 
jurisprudence can provide a legitimate foundation for mediation without reliance on 
the concept of neutrality. 
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Introduction 
 
The recent literature on the concept of neutrality in mediation acknowledges that 
whilst it is a core concept to the mediation process,1 it is also ironically a 
controversially flawed theoretical notion.2  Much of the academic critique asserts that 
neutrality is an unattainable aspiration,3 and yet many mediators, particularly those 
                                                 
1   For example, H Astor, ‘Rethinking Neutrality: A Theory to Inform Practice – Part I’ (2000) 11 
Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 73, and H Astor and C Chinkin, Dispute Resolution in Australia, 
Sydney: Butterworths (2nd ed, 2002).  
2   L Boulle, Mediation: Principles, Process, Practice, Sydney: Lexis Nexis (2nd ed, 2005) at 18. 
3   G Kurien, ‘Critique of Myths of Mediation’ (1995) 6 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 43 at 52.  
See also, for example, S Cobb and J Rifkin, ‘Practice and Paradox: Deconstructing Neutrality in 
Mediation’ (1991) 16 Law and Social Inquiry 35, M Feer, ‘Toward a New Discourse for Mediation: A 
Critique of Neutrality – Commentary’ (1992) 10(2) Mediation Quarterly 173, S Silbey, ‘Mediation 
Mythology’ (1993) 9(4) Negotiation Journal 349, TF Marshall, ‘The Power of Mediation’ (1990) 8(2) 
Mediation Quarterly 115, L Fisher, ‘What Mediators Bring to Practice: Process, Philosophy, Prejudice, 
Personality’ (2000) 5(4) ADR Bulletin 60, SE Bernard, JP Folger, HR Weingarten and ZR Zumeta ‘The 
Neutral Mediator: Value Dilemmas in Divorce Mediation’ (1984) 4 Mediation Quarterly 61, M 
McCormick, ‘Confronting Social Injustice as a Mediator’ (1997) 15 Mediation Quarterly 293, and R 
Dingwall, ‘Some Observations on Divorce Mediation in Britain and the United States’ (1986) 11 
Mediation Quarterly 5. 
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who practice problem-solving models of mediation, continue to see neutrality as an 
ethical requirement of their professional practice.4  
 
On an institutional level many dispute resolution services,5 and courts,6 include 
explicit claims about, or aspirations of, neutrality in the models of mediation they 
currently practise.  Where the issue of neutrality is left unaddressed (either in 
mediation service provider promotional material, or in the relevant guiding 
legislation) there is often an implicit attribution of neutrality to the role of the third-
party in the process.7  The practice of mediation occurs, then, in a number of different 
contexts with both explicit and implicit notions of neutrality remaining consistently 
relevant.  This is despite the recognition of the problems with neutrality that has 
occurred.   
 
Without the rhetoric of neutrality mediation as an alternative dispute resolution option 
may be less appealing to court administrators, the legal profession and government.  
The mirroring of judicial neutrality gives a false sense of security regarding the 
fairness of this process.  Further, the mediation profession’s adherence to the idea of 
neutrality arguably forestalls the growth and maturing of this unique dispute 
resolution option.8  There is a need, then, to consider what other philosophical 
approaches to the law and our justice system might assist the growth of mediation. 
 
A new theory in the legal discourse is that of therapeutic jurisprudence;9 a philosophy 
which enunciates a different framework for legal actors in our justice system. 
Therapeutic jurisprudence has provided an innovative approach to the law that has 
                                                 
4  In many other codes of mediator ethics and standards there are references to mediators as third party 
neutrals of some sort, or ‘neutrals’.  More recently, however, perhaps in response to the debate on 
neutrality the word “impartiality” has increasingly been used.  For example, in the model standards of 
the Association for Conflict Resolution (ACR): see www.acrnet.org (accessed 15 March 2006), and 
also in the Law Council of Australia’s ‘Ethical Standards for Mediators’, Updated February 2000, 
www.lawcouncil.asn.au (accessed 15 March 2006) which is based on the ACR model. 
5 For examples of descriptions of mediators as neutral third parties see the information on the role of a 
mediator provided by the Department of Justice Victoria www.justice.vic.gov.au (accessed 15 March 
2006) and the Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators Australia http://www.iama.org.au/mediation.htm 
(accessed 9 March 2006). 
6 For example, court-annexed mediations occur under the auspices of the Departments of Justice in 
both Victoria and Queensland.  The Dispute Resolution Settlement Centre of Victoria defines 
mediation as “a process in which the parties to a dispute, with the assistance of a neutral third party (the 
mediator) …”: see the Dispute Settlement Centre of Victoria Information Kit (2005) available at 
http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/CA2569020010922A (access 15 March 2006).  In Queensland the 
Dispute Resolutions Centres define mediation by saying that mediators “remain neutral – they do not 
take sides or pass judgment”: see http://justice.qld.gov.au/mediation/about/D04mediation.htm 
(accessed 15 March 2006). 
7 See generally L Boulle, ‘In and Out the Bramble Bush: ADR in Queensland Courts and Legislation’ 
(2004) 22 Law in Context 93.  Note also that the National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory 
Council deleted the word ‘neutral’ from its revised description of mediation, see National Alternative 
Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, Dispute Resolution Terms, Canberra (2003) at 9.  However, in 
their work on ADR standards NADRAC comments:  “NADRAC has considered the debate over the 
appropriateness and validity of the concept of ‘neutrality’, and has noted suggestions to abandon the 
concept and to use alternative concepts such as ‘consensuality’.  However, NADRAC believes that the 
concept of neutrality in ADR continues to have value.”: National Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Advisory Council, The Development of Standards for ADR: Report. Canberra (2001) at 114. 
8 B Mayer, Beyond Neutrality, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass (2004). 
9 See The International Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
http://www.therapeuticjurisprudence.org (accessed 17 March 2006).   
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brought about significant change.10  These changes are wide ranging11 and include the 
introduction of problem-solving courts,12 the promotion of therapeutic processes in 
correctional initiatives,13 and some changes in legal education.14  In Australia there 
have been many initiatives15 that could be categorised as taking on the therapeutic 
jurisprudence framework, including the adoption of a resolution by Western 
Australian Magistrates supporting this approach.16   The most significant support for 
therapeutic jurisprudence in this country has been in the criminal justice arena, where 
therapeutic jurisprudence has been linked to trends such as restorative justice.17  The 
potential of therapeutic jurisprudence to influence government policy makers and 
courts also seems to be growing.18   
 
In the following discussion we explore whether the philosophy of therapeutic 
jurisprudence can provide a new legitimising framework for mediation in place of the 
notion of neutrality.  We particularly consider recently articulated models of 
mediation, sometimes termed ‘second generation practice’,19 which eschew neutrality 
and provide a more robust engagement with social science theory.  These models 
include the storytelling,20 narrative,21 and transformative22 models of mediation.  First, 
we discuss neutrality in mediation, we then consider some of the problems with the 
notion of neutrality,23 and finally we explore whether it is possible to find in the new 
paradigm of therapeutic jurisprudence an affirmation of mediation’s ‘second 
generation’ of practice.   
 
1.  Neutrality in the Mediation Context 
 
The importance of neutrality in the mediation context is illustrated by the fact that 
traditional definitions of mediation almost always include a statement to the effect 
                                                 
10 DB Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Law as a Therapeutic Agent, Durham NS: Carolina 
Academic Press (1990). 
11 See website for the diverse applications of therapeutic jurisprudence and the growing literature The 
International Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence, above note 8. 
12 B Winnick and D Wexler, Judging in a Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Courts 
Durham NS: Carolina Academic Press (2003). 
13 A Birgden, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Sex Offenders: A Psycho-Legal Approach to Protection,’ 
(2004) 16 Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment 351. 
14 B Winick ‘Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Teaching Lawyering Skills: Meeting the Challenge of 
the New ABA Standards’ (2005) 17 St Thomas Law Review 429. 
15 M King, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Australia: New Directions in Courts, Legal Practice, 
Research and Legal Education’ (2006) 15 Journal of Judicial Administration 129. 
16 M King, ‘Country Magistrates’ Resolution on Therapeutic Jurispurdence’ (2005) 32 Brief 23. 
17 K Daly, H Hayes  and E Marchetti, ‘New Visions of Justice’ in A Goldsmith, M Israel and K Daly, 
(eds) Crime and Justice: A Guide to Criminology (3rd ed. 2006). 
18 S Jeffries, ‘How Justice ‘Gets Done’: Politics, Managerialism, Consumerism and Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence’ (2005) 17 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 254. 
19 S Cobb, ‘Dialogue and the Practice of Law and Spiritual Values: Creating Sacred Space: Toward a 
Second-Generation Dispute Resolution Practice,’ (2001) 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal, 1017 at 
1029. 
20 S Cobb, ‘Empowerment and Mediation: A Narrative Perspective’ (1993) 9 Negotiation Journal 245. 
21 J Winslade and G Monk, Narrative Mediation: A New Approach to Conflict Resolution, San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass (2000). 
22 See RA Baruch Bush and JP Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through 
Empowerment and Recognition, revised ed., San Francisco: Jossey Bass, (2005). 
23   That is to say that these problems have long been iterated, however with little practical impact. 
3 
that ‘the mediator is a neutral intervener in the parties’ dispute’.24  And yet neutrality 
is not a term with a clear or precise meaning in the context of mediation.25  In fact 
mediators themselves have been acknowledged as having a ‘very limited vocabulary 
to explain how neutrality functions.’26  As a result there is little commonality amongst 
mediators about the meaning of neutrality in practice,27 and relatively rigorous debate 
continues in the field of dispute resolution about the general meaning of the term.28    
 
Indeed, neutrality is a fundamentally elusive concept in mediation,29 and one that is 
manifestly under-defined.30  For example, much of the literature on neutrality 
assumes or infers an understanding of what neutrality means without being explicit 
about it.31  As a result, the notion has become ‘a sort of umbrella term that embraces a 
number of concepts,’32 and therefore conveys a variety of meanings.  For example, 
neutrality can be used to indicate that the mediator has no interest in the outcome of a 
dispute,33 that the mediator is not biased towards either party, and that the mediator 
generally lacks prior knowledge of the dispute and/or the parties.  A neutral mediator 
might also be said to be one who makes no judgment about the parties or their dispute, 
and is fair and even-handed throughout the process.34  
 
Neutrality, then, can be seen to involve ‘shades of meaning’.35  These shades of 
meaning make it an imprecise, ambiguous, and ‘fluid’36 concept; and one that is 
                                                 
24 Boulle above note 2 at 18.  See also J Folberg and A Taylor, Mediation: A Comprehensive Guide to 
Resolving Conflict Without Litigation, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass (1984) at 7-8, CW Moore, The 
Mediation Process, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass (3rd ed., 2003). This is reflected, for example, in ME 
Laflin, ‘Preserving the Integrity of Mediation Through the Adoption of Ethical Rules for Lawyer-
Mediators’ (2000) 14(1) Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 479, KK Kovach and 
LP Love, ‘Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin’s Grid’ (1998) 3 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 
71.  However, of note is the fact that Sir Laurence Street’s three fundamental principles of mediation 
do not include a reference to neutrality on the part of the mediator:  L Street, ‘The Language of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution’ (1992) 3 Australian Dispute Resolution Journal 144 at 146.   
25   As MacKay comments:  ‘It is easy enough to say that the mediator should be a neutral facilitator, 
but what does that mean?’: RB McKay ‘Ethical Considerations in Alternative Dispute Resolution’ 
(1989) 45 Arbitration Journal 15 at 21. 
26   J Rifkin, J Millen and S Cobb ‘Toward a New Discourse for Mediation: A Critique of Neutrality’ 
(1991) 9(2) Mediation Quarterly 151 at 152. 
27   Taylor refers to the lack of a shared vocabulary in mediation practice: A Taylor, ‘Concepts of 
Neutrality in Family Mediation: Contexts, Ethics, Influence and Transformative Process’ (1997) 14 
Mediation Quarterly 215 at 217. 
28   Astor above note 1 at 77.  H Gadlin and EW Pino ‘Neutrality: A Guide for the Organisation 
Ombudsperson’ (1997) 13 Negotiation Journal 17 at 17-18. 
29   Gadlin and Pino above note 28 at 17. 
30   For example, Laue has commented of the 1987 SPIDR ethical standards that ‘by my count, [the 
word neutrality] appears more than 35 times in the standards without any definition or description’:  J 
Laue in Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) (1987) ‘SPIDR’s Ethical Standards for 
Professional Conduct’ Forum, Newsletter of the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, March at 12. 
See also comments at note 8 above. 
31   RM Fuller, WD Kimsey, BC McKinney (1992) ‘Mediator Neutrality and Storytelling Order’ 10(2) 
Mediation Quarterly 187 at 187.  See also LM Cooks and CL Hale ‘The Construction of Ethics in 
Mediation’ (1994) 12(1) Mediation Quarterly 55 at 63. 
32   O Cohen, N Dattner, and A Luxenburg ‘The Limits of the Mediator’s Neutrality’ (1999) 16(4) 
Mediation Quarterly 341. 
33 GB Walker ‘Training Mediators: Teaching about Ethical Concerns and Obligations’ (1988)19 
Mediation Quarterly 33. 
34   See for example, Astor and Chinkin above note 1. 
35   Taylor above note 27 at 216. 
36   Astor above note 1 at 79. 
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predominantly intuitive as opposed to rational and logical.37  As Taylor puts it, 
neutrality is very ‘context sensitive’,38 involving a flexible ‘continuum’ where, in her 
view, practice is the determinant of whether a mediator’s actions are ‘appropriately 
neutral or not.’39  The various and varied meanings of neutrality in mediation result in 
the term being both a descriptor for the values of the process, as well as for the 
general role of the mediator.  It is a concept that covers practical elements, as well as 
ethical standards, of mediator conduct.  Neutrality unavoidably, then, involves a 
‘complex set of intertwined values, ethics, and best practices for different settings.’40   
 
In reality, however, this flexibility of meaning and connotation can be dangerous.  
This is particularly the case when real ambiguity is accompanied by an underlying 
assumption that no explicit explanation of what is meant by neutrality is considered 
necessary.41  The lack of any true collectively, consistently supported meaning of 
neutrality in the mediation context means not only that it is unable to provide practical 
assistance in terms of the real ‘situations that may transpire in a mediation’;42 but also 
that a folklore around neutrality has been allowed to develop that has ‘served to 
mystify … how neutrality works in practice.’43  These dilemmas arising from 
neutrality are clearly evident in the problem-solving models of mediation that are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
2.  The Centrality of Neutrality to Problem-Solving Mediation 
 
Boulle suggests that defining theoretical differences in how neutrality might be 
conceived in the many differing models of mediation can help appropriately situate 
and refine our understanding of neutrality.44  Different approaches to, and models of, 
mediation view the issue of neutrality in diverse ways, and much of the discourse 
surrounding neutrality incorporates ideology.45  The neutrality ideology has been 
linked by Cobb to a moral commitment to concepts such as equality, participation, 
voice, and personal responsibility.46  No wonder, then, that mediators who want to see 
themselves as good, moral and democratic dispute resolution practitioners continue to 
                                                 
37   K Gibson, L Thompson and MH Bazerman ‘Shortcomings of Neutrality in Mediation: Solutions 
Based on Rationality’ (1996) 12(1) Negotiation Journal 69 at 69. Cohen, Dattner and Luxenburg also 
comment on the ambiguity of the term neutrality: above note 32 at 342. 
38   Taylor above note 27 at 220. 
39   Relevant issues to this determination are said to be ‘the level and frequency of intervention, the 
extent to which our influence becomes direct and concentrated, and the context in which is it done’: 
Taylor above note 27 at 233. 
40   Taylor above note 27 at 226. 
41   B Wilson, ‘Mediation and Morality’ (2000) Family Law 853 at 853. 
42   Astor and Chinkin above note 1 at 232. 
43   Rifkin, Millen and Cobb above note 26 at 152. 
44  The four models mentioned by Boulle are: settlement, facilitative, transformative and evaluative; the 
evaluative model is a model in which the mediator is very interventionist: above note 2 at 44-45.  
Wolski comments on this sort of analytical framework, however, that whilst it is useful it ‘can disguise 
the extent to which all mediators influence the course and outcome of mediations’:  B Wolski, 
‘Mediator Settlement Strategies: Winning Friends and Influencing People’(2001) 12(4) Australasian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 248 at 249. 
45 See for a discussion of a range of approaches JR Coben, ‘Gollum, Meet Smeagol: A Schizophrenic 
Rumination on Mediator Values Beyond Self-Determination and Neutrality,’ 5 Cardozo Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 65. 
46 Cobb says that ‘moral values are so pervasive within our democratic culture that we do not notice 
them as moral commitments; we do not notice them as a frame containing moral discussions that is 
itself a moral framework.’: Cobb above note 19 at 1019. 
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see the notion of neutrality as central and key.  The ideology of neutrality is most 
clearly, and most persistently, located in what might be considered traditional 
problem-solving models of mediation.   
 
The key problem-solving models of mediation include settlement, facilitative and 
evaluative mediation.47  The dominance of these models is confirmed, for example, 
by the fact that the influential body, the National Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Advisory Council (NADRAC), often assumes in its literature a problem-solving 
orientation that centres on these models.48  Boulle, and others, have also described 
problem-solving models as the dominant models of mediation.49   
 
These models arguably allow for superficial assertions to be made of third party 
(mediator) neutrality because the mediator’s focus is on reaching a solution.  Such 
models emphasise, consistent with liberal legal ideology, the importance of the 
individual, and focus on finding an end result, or outcome, to the problem that brings 
the parties to the mediation table.  They tend to assume that the parties are 
‘autonomous, self-contained, atomistic individuals, each motivated by the pursuit of 
satisfaction of his or her own separate self interests.’50  It is also an assumption in 
relation to these models that the mediator’s expertise is focussed on process only and 
that their facilitation role involves predominantly assisting the parties to their own 
mutually agreed outcome of the dispute.51  A notion of neutrality becomes plausible if 
the rhetoric is that the mediator’s focus in problem-solving mediation is on process 
only, as opposed to the content or outcome of the dispute. 
 
The notion of neutrality can also be argued as necessary in the context of problem-
solving mediation in that it can be seen as playing an ‘important legitimising 
function’.52  The problem-solving nature of these models is comparable to the 
problem-solving nature of litigation; and problem-solving mediation is arguably made 
credible through its association with neutrality,53 which can also be found comparably 
in terms of the ideology of judicial impartiality.54  Parties in dispute are potentially 
drawn to the mediation process on the basis of neutrality’s promise of fairness and its 
offer of protection against biased or unfair practice.  These protections can be said to 
                                                 
47 Boulle, above note 2 at 45-46. 
48  See for example National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, The Development of 
Standards for ADR: Report Canberra (2001). 
49 Boulle above note 2 at 46 and  DJ Della Noce, RA Baruch Bush and JP Folger, ‘Clarifying the 
Theoretical Underpinnings of Mediation: Implications for Practice and Policy,’ (2002) 3 Pepperdine 
Dispute Resolution Law Journal 39 at 49: “The problem-solving model, while seldom going by that 
precise name, and seldom acknowledging or exposing its ideological roots, is the dominant model in 
the mediation field.”  We prefer the term settlement based mediation.  There are some positive 
attributes in relation to problem-solving, that arguably should be retained, but the focus of the 
mediation should not be upon settlement, a driving force to achieve a solution to the problem. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Boulle above note 2 at 18-19.  See also Astor above note 1 at 74 referring to S Cobb and J Rifkin, 
‘Neutrality as a Discursive Practice:  The Construction and Transformation of Narratives in 
Community Mediation’ (1991) 11 Studies in Law and Politics 69 and C Harrington and S Engle Merry, 
‘Ideological Production:  The Making of Community Mediation’ (1998) 22 Law and Society Review 
709 . 
53  B Mayer ‘The Dynamics of Power in Mediation and Negotiation’ (1987) 16 Mediation Quarterly 75 
at 83. 
54  Boulle above note 2 at 18-19. 
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connect problem-solving mediation with the authority and legitimacy of formal legal 
adjudication processes.55   
 
Whilst the settlement, evaluative and facilitative models of mediation are all 
predominantly about results-oriented problem-solving and assisting parties to arrive at 
their own resolution of their dispute, each model is unique in its approach.  For 
example, the settlement model of mediation seeks to assist the parties to achieve 
consensus through an emphasis on incremental bargaining techniques.  Mediator 
interventions tend to focus parties on a central point of compromise, and the 
negotiation phase of the mediation often includes a trading approach to achieve 
settlement.  The facilitative model draws on negotiation theory to identify the parties’ 
underlying needs and interests. This model is said to be ‘process based’, focussing on 
the way decisions are made rather than on the substance of the decision.56 Creative 
problem-solving is used to attempt a ‘win-win’ solution for the conflict.57  Boulle 
notes that the facilitative model is the model most represented in the mediation 
literature and is the most common approach to training.58  And finally, evaluative 
mediation uses the likely court outcome of the dispute to inform the negotiations, and 
the mediator uses his or her expertise in the area to bring about an agreement between 
the parties.59  (This model, due to its highly interventionist nature will not be a focus 
for our discussions in this article; although, the neutrality claim can also be said to 
apply to evaluative models of mediation, in that it can be said that the mediators’ 
expertise can be used in a neutral way.60) 
 
In both the settlement and facilitative models, the assertion that the mediator is neutral 
supports an understanding of the mediator as a disinterested third party who is able to 
guide the disputants through the mediation process without influencing their decision-
making as to the content and outcome of the dispute.  Boulle, for example, has 
identified the facilitative model as trying ‘to uphold the neutrality of the mediator.’61   
 
There are, however, many issues arising from the neutrality claim in problem-solving 
mediation.  Some of these issues derive from the falsity of neutrality, and are the 
focus of discussion in the next section; but others arise as a result of the morally 
driven belief in the truth of neutrality, referred to above.   
 
For example, it is problematic from the perspective of achieving sustainable conflict 
resolution, that the ostensibly neutral stance of the mediator in outcome and results-
oriented problem-solving models can result in insufficient time or attention being 
devoted to emotional issues in disputes.62   Clearly, a neutral mediator who controls 
process only is unable to involve themselves extensively in the detail of the parties’ 
                                                 
55  Ibid at 18-19. 
56  Ibid at 171. 
57  Ibid at 44-45. 
58  Ibid at 46. 
59  Riskin, who originally articulated a grid with the evaluative and facilitative categories, has revised 
the grid and the concepts and renamed them directive and elicitive, see L Riskin, ‘Decisionmaking in 
Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System’ (2003-2004) 79 Notre Dame Law 
Review 2. 
60 For example, along the lines of conciliation processes. 
61 Boulle above note 2 at 46 where he continues that the facilitative model also tries to uphold: “the 
process/content distinction, the minimalist intervention style and the consensuality of outcomes.” 
62 Bush and Folger above note 22 at 239-247. 
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emotions and relationships.  Therefore, in many problem-solving mediations, 
particularly, for example, in court-connected mediation contexts, and in legal 
mediation contexts where the ‘shadow of the law’ is very strong,63 relationship 
dimensions of conflict can be subordinated, because of a commitment to or belief in 
neutrality, to legal norms and court practices.  These norms and practices at best pay 
only lip-service to issues of emotion,64 or deal with emotion through simplistic 
venting.65
 
The next section considers in more detail how neutrality can be argued to be a false or 
misleading concept in problem-solving mediation, and examines some of the 
dilemmas that arise from the falsity of the notion.  This leads us into a discussion of 
‘second-generation’ mediation practices that contrast with problem-solving mediation, 
and can be considered as offering practical and positive approaches to mediation that 
can be said to be supported and grounded by the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence; 
approaches that do not rely on false concepts of neutrality. 
 
3. The Falsity of Neutrality in Problem-Solving Mediation 
 
Notwithstanding the neutrality claim associated with the practice of problem-solving 
models of mediation, each of the models can be exposed as contradicting the 
possibility of neutrality.  Certainly, the critical mediation literature acknowledges the 
contradictions in theoretical and practical conceptions of neutrality in mediation; and 
confirms the inconsistency of the fact that neutrality remains a core concept to 
problem-solving mediation even whilst the dangers and difficulties of labelling 
mediators as neutral third parties are apparent.66  Professor Boulle, for example, 
referring to the work of Tillet and Kurien, concedes that neutrality can be considered 
‘the most pervasive and misleading myth about mediation.’67   
 
Neutrality can be said to be a false or misleading concept in the context of problem-
solving mediation for a number of reasons.  For example, whilst the rhetoric of the 
term can sound convincing, clearly ‘pure neutrality is very difficult to achieve and 
sustain.’68  This is partly because experiential imperatives arising in the mediation 
room (where mediators are working ‘to assist clients who are struggling not only with 
interpersonal conflicts, but also intra-personal issues’69) sometimes require a 
departure from conceptual notions of neutrality.70   That is, it is inevitable that a 
                                                 
63  R Mnookin and L Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce’ (1979) 
88 Yale Law Journal 950. 
64  N Alexander, ‘Mediation on Trial: Ten Verdicts On Court-Related ADR’ (2004) 22 Law in Context 
8, 17; the exception may be in the Family Law jurisdiction. 
65 S Retzinger and T Scheff, ‘Emotion, Alienation, and Narratives: Resolving Intractable Conflict,’ 
(2000) 18 Mediation Quarterly 71. 
66  ‘Definitions of mediation and codes of conduct for mediators often overlook the multiple 
dimensions of neutrality in their characterisation of mediators as neutral facilitators.’  Boulle above 2 at 
19.  Astor comments that neutrality is ‘a highly contested term for mediators’ and has been ‘subjected 
to constant analysis, debate and redefinition.’ Astor above note 1 at 74. 
67   Boulle above note 2 at 19.  See also G Tillet (1991) Resolving Conflict – A Practical Approach, 
Sydney:  Sydney University Press, G Tillet (1991) The Myths of Mediation, The Centre for Conflict 
Resolution, Macquarie University and Kurien above note 4. 
68   Bernard et al above note 3 at 72. 
69   Taylor above note 27 at 215. 
70   Taylor asks:  ‘The question for practitioners is whether articles like those of Rifkin, Millen and 
Cobb (1991), which propose a theoretical basis for understanding neutrality, are so conceptual as to be 
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mediator’s actions and decisions in a mediation will be influenced to some extent by 
their own emotional reaction to the parties and the dispute, as well as their ‘own 
knowledge, experiences, and values.’71  Whether the mediator is aware of it or not, an 
element of transference and counter-transference between them and the parties cannot 
be avoided.72
 
Another reason why neutrality can be considered a flawed concept in mediation is that, 
in the reality of mediation practice, mediators are truly powerful, and any ‘notion that 
mediators are passive participants in a process shaped by forces they have not 
deployed’ is not accurate.73  The work of Greatbatch and Dingwall, for example, has 
shown how mediator values and judgments can, and often do, enter the process and 
influence outcomes.74  In particular, in terms of the settlement and facilitative models, 
we know that some mediators will prioritise the reaching of a settlement, any 
settlement and will use what Greatbatch and Dingwall refer to as ‘selective 
facilitation’ to push negotiations towards achieving an outcome.  In this way, the 
mediator is clearly not neutral and has a significant impact on both the content and 
outcome of the mediation.  They cannot simply be said to be a process expert.75   
 
Astor and Chinkin also warn that ‘it is not sufficient simply to claim mediator 
neutrality (as) mediators have considerable power in mediation and there is evidence 
that they do not always exercise it in a way which is entirely neutral as to content and 
outcome.’76  According to Silbey ‘mediators exercise power by manipulating the 
immediate situation of mediation, and the interactions and communication between 
the parties, in order to control and shape the outcomes.’77  It is also known that the 
exercise of mediator power in this way can be gendered.  For example, the Report on 
the Evaluation of the Family Court of Australia Mediation Service stated that ‘women 
were significantly more likely to report that mediators pressured them into agreement 
or tried to impose their viewpoints on them.’78
 
                                                                                                                                            
of limited value to the practitioner.’ Taylor above note 27 at 218.  As Astor has put it:  ‘Whilst 
practitioners make decisions every day about neutrality, it does not seem that those decisions are very 
much informed or assisted by the current research and theorising about neutrality.’: Astor above note 1 
at 77. 
71   Cohen, Dattner and Luxenburg above note 32 at 342. 
72   Cohen, Dattner and Luxenburg above 32 at 342. 
73   Silbey above note 3 at 352. 
74   R Dingwall and D Greatbatch ‘Who is in Charge?  Rhetoric and Evidence in the Study of 
Mediation’ (1993) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 365, and D Greatbatch and R Dingwall 
‘Selective Facilitation:  Some Observations on a Strategy Use by Divorce Mediators’ (1989) 23 Law 
and Society Review 613.  See also Mayer above note 8; Wade above note 37.  Della Noce at al also 
note the reality that mediator practices can and do influence the parties’ conflict, (and raise) questions 
of what kinds of influence are appropriate and why, the nature of differences in mediators’ motives and 
orientations, and how different underlying ideologies shape mediators’ goals, and therefore, their 
influence on the conflict, in very different ways: above note 49 at 47. 
75 Boulle points to a growing realization amongst mediators of this issue and the concomitant 
realisation that neutrality is an aspiration rather than a reality see Boulle above note 2 at 35. 
76   Astor and Chinkin above note 1 at 102.  Professor Wade has said that ‘virtually every step taken by 
a mediator involves the exercise of power.’: J Wade, ‘Forms of Power in Family Mediation and 
Negotiation’ (1994) 6 Australian Journal of Family Law 40 at 54.  The research of Greatbatch and 
Dingwall asserts that mediators are clearly not neutral in their mediation practice above note 74. 
77   Silbey above note 3 at 352. 
78   Sophy Bordow and Janne Gibson Evaluation of the Family Court Mediation Service Family Court 
of Australia Research and Evaluation Unit (1994) at 112. 
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In terms of evaluative models, it has been said that the concept of a neutral, and yet 
evaluative mediator, is an oxymoron.79  This is because evaluation is an inherently 
non-neutral activity.  It requires an engagement with the parties, their issues and their 
dispute, that is not envisaged in terms of how the notion of ‘neutrality’ ostensibly 
works in problem-solving mediation.  
 
Another reason why the idea of neutrality is unreal in problem-solving mediation is 
that being neutral can contradict or interfere with what some mediators consider, in 
these models, to be their ethical duty to ensure just outcomes.  Bernard et al, for 
example, consider neutrality to be a lesser value in the mediation process than the 
commitment to ensuring ‘fairness, or win-win settlements.’80  On this basis some 
mediators, consciously, non-neutrally and actively intervene for the benefit of a 
weaker party or absent third parties, such as children.81  McCormick has asserted that 
‘a mediator committed to representation of all the interests cannot be preoccupied 
with neutrality.’82
 
A further problematic complication arises in the theoretical distinction that is 
sometimes drawn between neutrality and impartiality.83  The aim of this distinction is 
in fact to address some of the problems with the concept of neutrality in mediation by 
acknowledging that a mediator may not always be neutral, but should always be 
impartial.84  That is, certain mediator uses of power in mediation (for example 
interventions, actions or evaluations) are considered legitimate even though they 
might be said to strictly contradict the notion of neutrality; this legitimacy derives 
from the basis that such conduct can still be said to sit within the concept of 
impartiality.85  However, such semantic distinctions are not necessarily meaningful or 
practically relevant for mediators or parties in terms of how they experience the 
reality of the mediation room. Many people, for example, consider neutrality and 
impartiality to be synonymous.  We don’t consider the distinction to be particularly 
useful, then, in any real sense; at least not without detailed explanation being provided 
to the parties. 
 
On the basis of the issues with neutrality in problem-solving mediation articulated 
here, we support approaches to mediation that move beyond the current preoccupation 
with false assertions of neutrality.  We consider it imperative that parties have a clear 
and accurate understanding of what the mediation process can and cannot do for 
                                                 
79  Kovach and Love above note 24. 
80   Bernard et al above note 3 at 72. 
81   Astor considers that this has ‘the regrettable consequence that what many mediators would regard 
as ethical behaviour involves loss of neutrality: H Astor, ‘Rethinking Neutrality: A Theory to Inform 
Practice – Part II’ (2000) Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 145 at 147. 
82   M McCormick (1997) ‘Confronting Social Injustice as a Mediator’ 15 Mediation Quarterly 293 at 
295. 
83 ‘In the case of mediation, each concept (of neutrality and impartiality) has a different significance.  
Impartiality must be regarded as a core requirement in mediation, in the sense that its absence would 
fundamentally undermine the nature of the process.  It is inconceivable that the parties could waive the 
requirement that the mediator act fairly.  Neutrality, however, is a less absolute requirement and could 
be waived without prejudicing the integrity of the mediation process, for example in relation to a 
mediator’s prior contact with one of the parties or his or her previous knowledge about the dispute.’ 
Boulle above note 2 at 20. 
84  Boulle above note 2 at 20. 
85 Boulle asserts that impartiality can be used to refer to ‘an even-handedness, objectivity and fairness 
towards the parties during the mediation process.’: Boulle above note 2 at 19.   
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them,86 and as neutrality cannot realistically be achieved we argue that the better 
approach is to move to models of mediation that can be supported in other ways.  Our 
belief is that the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence offers a potential way forward for 
doing away with the perceived need for neutrality to be a legitimising concept for 
mediation.  In particular, therapeutic jurisprudence can be seen to provide a strong 
theoretical foundation to what is known as ‘second generation’ mediation practice.  
Some of these approaches to mediation are discussed in the next section.  
 
4.  Mediation’s ‘Second Generation Practice’: Models of Mediation Not Reliant 
on Neutrality 
 
In contrast to problem-solving mediation, some newer approaches to mediation 
developed in the last decade reject neutrality and instead place a higher value on the 
mediator’s engagement with the parties and their connection with important emotional 
and relationship issues in the mediation setting (as opposed to being focussed 
predominantly on achieving a settlement).  These new models which have been 
termed ‘second generation practice’, have a focus on the community and the wider 
dimensions of conflict, steering away from the individualistic, outcome satisfaction-
based criteria of problem-solving models that are focussed on settlement outcomes.   
 
Proponents and practitioners of ‘second generation practice’ models of mediation are 
not afraid, or reluctant, to acknowledge the impact the mediator has, in reality, on the 
content of mediation; and thereby are ready to acknowledge the falsity of assertions of 
neutrality in the mediation context.   Sara Cobb believes that it is this 
acknowledgement that in fact results in a more theoretically robust approach to 
mediation:  
 
This is a radical departure from what could be called ‘first-generation’ 
mediation practice, where the mandate not to impact on the content of the 
dispute is thought to be essential to preserving the privilege the parties have to 
define their own problems and build their own solutions.  However, once we 
adopt an interactionist or social constructionist perspective, the mandate to 
separate content from process dissolves, as mediators recognize the 
inevitability of their impact on the content of the dispute.  This attention to the 
evolution of the content calls for a ‘second-generation’ mediation practice in 
which mediators interact with disputants so as to evolve the conflict stories, 
reformulate relationships, reframe the past and rebuild the future.87   
 
‘Second generation practice’ mediation models, which include mediation as 
storytelling, narrative mediation and transformative mediation, each reject mediator 
neutrality in favour of prioritising and valuing mediator intervention and 
engagement.88  They incorporate interdisciplinary approaches to mediation which 
include post-modern and social constructionist theory.  Each model is discussed 
below, with a focus on considering the ways in which they explicitly move away from 
any reliance on the concept of neutrality. 
 
                                                 
86  Boulle above note 2. 
87 Cobb above note 19 at 1029. 
88 As indicated each include postmodern and social constructivism in their theories, but each also 
include significant differences in their models. 
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4.1 Mediation as Storytelling 
 
A ‘second-generation practice’ model developed by Cobb is known as ‘mediation as 
storytelling’.89  In this model, the mediator intervenes (a non-neutral activity) in the 
stories being told by the parties to a dispute in order to empower them through 
enhanced participation.  The mediator works to destabilise the parties’ original 
narratives, which allows each party then to contribute, along with the participative and 
involved mediator, to the construction of a new joint narrative.90  The mediator can 
use generic mediation techniques, such as opening statements, private meetings and 
questioning to facilitate the process of the co-construction of the parties’ story.  The 
co-constructed story then works as the foundation on which resolution of the dispute 
can be based.   
 
In ‘mediation as storytelling’ morality is embedded in the individual stories that 
disputants bring to mediation.  It is an almost inevitable part of each party’s 
developing narrative that the other party to the dispute is the wrongdoer and they 
should change or need to change.  Through the telling of the stories, and through overt 
mediator interventions (which include a favouring of versions of reality), shifts can 
occur in the parties’ perceptions and understandings of each other and of the dispute.  
That is, parties are able to see each other in terms of the victim story that they have 
brought to the mediation (double witnessing) and this leads to the possibility of a co-
constructed story that equates to a new view of the dispute.   
 
This approach, Cobb asserts, allows the collective community (at least of the 
mediation environment) to witness the conflict and restore harmony through the 
creation and acknowledgment of social norms.91  Clearly, there is no room in this 
model for the language of neutrality, or for any pretence of a value-free framework 
for such practice.  Rather, the mediator must be accepted as an engaged and active 
participant in deconstructing the egocentricity of the parties’ original moral stances 
and in contributing to the rebuilding of the new joint narrative. 
 
4.2 Narrative Mediation 
 
Another form of ‘second generation practice’ is a model of mediation that has grown 
out of narrative therapy in New Zealand, and is known as ‘narrative mediation’.  This 
model is similar to Cobb’s in that it constructs mediation as a storytelling process. 
The creators of ‘narrative mediation’ reject the problem-solving model and the 
pretense of neutrality,92 and adopt social constructionism as a theoretical basis for 
practice.93   This approach incorporates existing larger societal stories and their effect 
upon the stories that each participant expounds in the mediation.  The differing 
stories that participants bring to the mediation are a matter of perspective. The 
mediator makes clear that when perspectives differ it is due to the diverse 
understanding of meanings.  Through a number of mediator interventions, such as 
curious questioning and externalizing the problem, mediators in this model seek to 
                                                 
89  Cobb above note 20.  
90  Cobb above note 19.  
91  Ibid at 1031. 
92 Winslade and Monk above note 21 at 35-37. 
93 Ibid 37-54. 
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destablise stories of mutual blame and ask participants to contribute to an alternative 
story.   
 
Power is a concern in this model and the mediator will deconstruct issues relating to 
power such as gender and race.94  However, human agency is acknowledged.  That is, 
the mediator is reflective about his/her own power in the mediation, described as 
reflexivity, and the way that privilege and power is discussed and deconstructed by 
the mediator is noted as affecting the story of the mediation.  ‘This process of 
opening to view is not a neutral activity, however.  Reflexive moves that would make 
relational positions evident begin in themselves to shift or transform these 
positions.’95  
 
A new story can be created from the experience of the mediation that is a shared story 
and the mediator has the authority, from the process of mediation, to contribute to this 
story.96  The stories may be written as part of the mediation process. 97  Again, as 
with ‘mediation as storytelling’, as a co-author of the resultant story, the mediator 
must be accepted as an inherently non-neutral participant in the parties’ discussions, 
explorations and negotiations. 
 
4.3 Transformative Mediation 
 
Proponents of ‘transformative mediation’ see the process as offering an opportunity to 
deal with conflict in a unique manner.98  Unlike litigation, and other dispute 
resolution options, transformative mediation is seen as providing a forum for the 
exploration of the relational dimension of conflict and as providing the possibility of 
the transformation of the parties’ conflict.99  This approach to disputes shares the 
similarity with ‘narrative mediation’ that it relies on post-modern and social 
constructionist literature.100    
 
Importantly for the purposes of this article, under this model, the mediator pursues the 
outcome of transformation explicitly in the mediation, and does not ascribe to a 
neutral position.101  The aim of the process is to achieve the twin objectives of 
empowerment and recognition contributing to moral growth.  Parties can achieve 
empowerment through deciding for themselves how to address the conflict they are 
experiencing.  Mediator interventions encourage parties to see the conflict from the 
other party’s point of view, achieving a degree of empathy (referred to as recognition).   
                                                 
94 Ibid at 40. 
95 Ibid at 121.  
96 Ibid at 121-122. 
97 Ibid at 37-47. 
98  Bush and Folger above note 22 at 37. 
99  Ibid at 60. 
100 Della Noce et al above note 49 at 48. 
101 Boulle above note 2 at 46 argues that in regard to the transformative model ‘The mediator’s most 
significant function is to conduct and maintain the process and have no active role in the parties’ 
decision-making, This reduced role and responsibility enables mediators to retain their neutrality in 
conducting the process.’  In contrast we would argue that the theory of transformative mediation as 
practised by Bush and Folger recognises the problematic nature of neutrality and acknowledges the 
impact of the mediator upon the mediation with the aim of achieving the normative orientation of 
conflict transformation and moral growth.  See Della Noce et al above note 49 at 57 where they state 
that ‘the mythology of absolute mediator neutrality and unitary practice could not be sustained; even 
imported theories were revealed to be value-based.’ 
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The moral growth of participants is seen as having an effect on the disputing parties (a 
private benefit), but also on the wider community (a public benefit) through 
participant education in dealing with conflict.102
 
This approach when analyzing what conflict means to people draws upon the work of 
a number of disciplines including, communication, cognitive psychology and social 
psychology.103  Bush and Folger, the authors of the transformative model, focus on 
the way humans react to conflict.  Their theory is informed by the view that an 
individual’s reaction to conflict is a form of crisis.  When parties are faced with 
significant disagreement there is a sense of disempowerment and displacement so that 
an individual’s sense of self and relationships with others is affected.  Parties humanly 
react to this sense of weakness by becoming self-absorbed and self-centred.104  
According to Bush and Folger: ‘If a person’s core sense of identity is linked to a sense 
of both autonomy and connection, and if both of those are compromised at the very 
same time, it makes perfect sense that this will be a profoundly disturbing 
experience.’105  This process is described as a negative spiral of conflict.  The 
transformative model assists mediators to recognize the negative spiral of conflict and 
provides a number of interventions to reverse this spiral.106  Answers to the problem 
that brought the parties to the mediation may be decided on as part of the process, but 
this outcome is not the primary aim.  Indeed, the ‘satisfaction story’ of problem-
solving models of mediation with their focus upon solutions, is rejected by this model. 
107  Through facilitating the transformation of the parties, the mediator demonstrates a 
level of engagement and interaction in the process that cannot be reconciled with 
neutrality. 
 
These three models of mediation, storytelling, narrative and transformative, 
demonstrate that it is possible to conceptualise effective mediation without reliance on 
the rhetoric of neutrality.  What remains necessary, however, is a deeper theoretical 
perspective to provide a strong foundation to these various models, and to sustain 
their legitimacy.  We argue that there is potential to find this foundation in the concept 
of therapeutic jurisprudence.   
 
5.  Finding A Resonance Between Second Generation Mediation Models and 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Non-Neutral Mediation 
 
In the preceding sections of this article theoretical and practical problems with 
neutrality in mediation generally, and in problem-solving mediation in particular, 
were discussed.  We also suggested that therapeutic jurisprudence could offer a new 
theoretical and conceptual paradigm for the practice of ‘second generation’ mediation 
models that do not rely on the rhetoric of neutrality.  This section explores the notion 
of therapeutic jurisprudence and argues for it as a new theoretical basis to constructive 
contemporary mediation practice. 
 
                                                 
102  Bush and Folger above note 22 at 78. 
103  Ibid at 48. 
104  Ibid at 55. 
105  Ibid at 61. 
106  Ibid at 45-53. 
107  Bush and Folger above note 22 at 9-18. 
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It is our view that an entirely new theoretical basis to mediation is required because 
the suggestions that have been made to date to overcome the falsity of neutrality in 
mediation are inadequate.  For example, proposals to re-contextualise the concept of 
neutrality to give it meaning,108 or to re-conceptualise it to make it more relevant to 
practical issues and realities,109 are not clear enough to make a sound practical impact.  
Nor is the suggestion for a situated approach that moves from a binary construct of 
neutrality, as either existent or non-existent, to a broader concept of legitimizing 
mediation through focusing on notions of consensuality and ‘maximizing party 
control.’110   
 
These suggestions fail to recognise the full extent of the problems associated with 
assertions of neutrality in the mediation context, and whilst some look to promote 
approaches to mediation in which the notion of neutrality is absent, they become 
practically untenable because the dichotomy of first and second generational 
mediation practice is not acknowledged.   
 
In addition, some of the ideas, whilst conceding that neutrality is problematic, still 
suggest a continuing element of emphasis or reliance on neutrality as a legitimising 
factor for problem-solving models of mediation.  This indicates to us that mediation 
practitioners remain unready simply to abandon the notion of neutrality.111  Mayer 
concludes that the fact that mediators continue to rely so heavily on neutrality as a 
defining feature of their process and practice, places the mediation profession in 
crisis.112  This is because, in his view and as is borne out by ‘second generation 
practice’ models, neutrality is not necessarily what parties embroiled in conflict are 
looking for.  His contention is that the neutrality tag has largely been about reassuring 
courts, and government, of the ability of mediation to mirror, to some extent, validity 
of the litigation process.113
 
The apparent lack of readiness to let go of the concept of neutrality by mediators 
could also possibly be attributed to the fact that many mediation practitioners are 
challenged by the emerging professional status of mediation.  Once known 
predominantly as an ‘industry’, now increasingly considered a profession in its own 
right, mediators perhaps are struggling with the juxtaposition of their practical roots 
and the theoretical requirements of a profession; particularly a profession so closely 
associated with the law.  This may not necessarily be the stuff of crisis, but it is 
important to recognise that there will be damaging consequences for the credibility of 
mediation as a profession if mediation practitioners do not engage with the neutrality 
dilemma in a more sophisticated way.  Mediation’s future may well be compromised 
                                                 
108 D Bryson and D Winset, ‘A New Conciliation Model: Mediating Within the Law’ in T Fisher (ed) 
Proceedings of the 4th National Mediation Conference La Trobe University: Melbourne (1998) at 275 – 
279. 
109   Taylor above note 27. 
110   Astor above note 1 and note 47.  See also on the importance of consensuality: B Wolski, 
‘Voluntariness and Consensuality: Defining Characteristics of Mediation?’ (1997) 15 Australian Bar 
Review 213. 
111  D Gorrie ‘Mediator Neutrality: High Ideal or Sacred Cow?’. In L Fisher (ed), Conference 
Proceedings, Famcon ’95, Third national Family Mediation Conference, Sydney (1995) at 30. 
112  Mayer above note 8 at 17. 
113  Ibid. 
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if practitioners take an unreflective approach, are slow to grapple with theory, or 
remain wedded to ‘how to’ approaches to mediation.114   
 
One of our objectives in writing this article is to go some way toward helping to 
encourage a more reflective approach amongst mediation practitioners; another 
objective is to make a contribution to the development of mediation theory.  Our 
arguments in the next sections look to a professional future for mediation that offers 
significant potential. 
 
5.1 Therapeutic Jurisprudence115
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence offers an alternative paradigm in which to situate and 
ground mediation practice, particularly second generational practice, without reliance 
on the notion of neutrality.  For professional mediators it offers a new way forward 
for conceptualising their practice without value-free pretences associated with the 
myth of neutrality. 
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence is a relatively recent concept in the development of legal 
theory. Sometimes described as an approach to practice rather than a theory,116 
therapeutic jurisprudence is considered to be a new way of looking at the law.117  
Therapeutic jurisprudence in the legal context asks legal actors, and traditional legal 
processes, to submit to a new kind of scrutiny by making the legal outcome of actions, 
including legal decisions of lawyers, judges and others participating in the legal 
system, the central focus of consideration.  In looking not only at the content of a case 
but also the process, therapeutic jurisprudence concerns itself with effects on the well-
being of participants.118  The theory asks questions about the effect on clients of the 
law; and of the impact on the emotional life and psychological well-being of those 
affected by our justice system.119  These are questions we think can be useful in the 
mediation context. 
  
Originating in the area of mental health law therapeutic jurisprudence attempts to 
chart the therapeutic impact, or lack of impact, of the legal system.  It is an 
interdisciplinary approach,120 utilising material from the social sciences.121  As 
                                                 
114 Della Noce et al above note 49 at 45.  For some discussion about mediators’ possible reluctance to 
engage with issues relating to concerns with mediator power in the process see H Astor, ‘Some 
Contemporary Theories of Power in Mediation: A Primer for the Puzzled Practitioner,’ (2005) 16 
Australasian Dispute Resolution Journal 30. 
115 The website for therapeutic jurisprudence provides information regarding new applications of this 
philosophy and a recently re-organised bibliography categorised by areas of practice, see The 
International Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence above note 9. 
116 A Frieberg, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Australia: Paradigm Shift or Pragmatic Incrementalism?’ 
(2003) 20 Law in Context 6, 9. 
117   M King and K Auty “Therapeutic Jurisprudence: An Emerging Trend in Courts of Summary 
Jurisdiction” (2005) 30(2) Alternative Law Journal 69 at 73. 
118  Ibid. 
119 Winnick and Wexler above note 12 at 12. 
120 Often used to provide a framework for interdisciplinary practice between various professions such 
as the law and social work: C Hartley and C Petrucci, ‘Justice, Ethics and Interdisciplinary Teaching 
and Practice: Practicing Culturally Competent Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between 
Social Work and the Law’ (2004) 14 Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 133. 
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indicated, this approach has been most widely adopted in Australia in the criminal 
justice jurisdiction.122  However, therapeutic jurisprudence can also be applied in the 
civil jurisdiction,123 and potentially to the diverse settings of mediation.  Importantly, 
therapeutic jurisprudence appears to have support from some areas of government in 
Australia.124  This potential attraction to policy makers is something we regard as 
valuable in terms of the potential of therapeutic jurisprudence to offer an alternative 
legitimising foundation to mediation practice. 
 
We are not the first to link therapeutic jurisprudence to mediation movement.125  Nor 
are we the first to find synergies between therapeutic jurisprudence and second-
generation models of mediation practice.126  There is established support for the 
assertion that therapeutic jurisprudence has much to offer in terms of conceptualising 
mediation practice.  We are we think, however, the first to consider the connection 
between therapeutic jurisprudence and a notion of mediation that is legitimate without 
neutrality.  Our concept of mediation uses the theory of therapeutic jurisprudence to 
exclude any need for a concept of neutrality on the basis that it places a greater value 
and emphasis on mediators taking responsibility for the impact of their professional 
practice on the wellbeing of parties as participants.  These issues are explored further 
in the next section. 
 
5.2 Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a Foundation to the Practice of Second 
Generation Mediation Models: Removing the Need for Neutrality. 
 
Importantly, the potential of therapeutic jurisprudence to ground and affirm second-
generation models of mediation is enhanced by the fact that it is not a theory that is 
constructed or reliant on legal positivist philosophy.127  That is, the legal positivist 
preoccupation with neutrality and neutral third parties, who represent the objective 
scientific approach of the positivist tradition, can be left behind in looking to 
therapeutic jurisprudence for a new approach.  This is because, refreshingly, 
therapeutic jurisprudence acknowledges the law as a social force, it sees the 
connection and integrative impact of social science and the law, and interprets legal 
processes, and has the potential to interpret mediation, in the light of its social impact.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
121 J Popovic, ‘Judicial Officers: Complementing Conventional Law and Changing the Culture of the 
Judiciary’ (2003) 20 Law in Context 121.  This has been utilised in the new courts, such as Drug and 
Koori courts. 
122  Ibid.  See also M King, ‘Applying Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Regional Areas - The Western 
Australian Experience,’ (2003) 10(2) E Law- Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law, 
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n2/king102.htmla (accessed 27 July 2005). 
123 See for example an analysis of recent USA civil case law and the therapeutic framework D Wexler, 
‘Lowering the Volume through Legal Doctrine: A Promising path for Therapeutic Jurisprudence 
Scholarship’ (2002) 3 Florida Coastal Law Journal 123. 
124 M McMahon and D Wexler, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Developments and Applications in 
Australia and New Zealand,’ (2003) 20 Law in Context 1. 
125 See for example A Schneider, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventative Law and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution,’ (1999) 5  Psychology, Public Policy and Law 1084 and A Schepard A, and J Bozzomo, 
‘Efficiency, Therapeutic Justice, Mediation, and Evaluation: Reflections On A Survey of Unified 
Family Courts.’ (2003) 37 Family Law Qaurterly 333. 
126 G Paquin G and L Harvey, ‘Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Transformative Mediation and Narrative 
Mediation: A Natural Connection’ (2002) 3 Florida Coastal Law Journal 167. 
127 M Davies, Asking the Law Question: The Dissolution of Legal Theory, Sydney: LawBook Co (2nd 
ed., 2002) at 90. 
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Importantly, proponents of therapeutic jurisprudence acknowledge the high value 
placed upon emotional well-being when assessing the impact of the law.  The 
normative agenda of the philosophy is to look for therapeutic outcomes where there is 
no conflict with other widely accepted values in the law, such as due process 
concerns.128  The philosophy has no pretence of being a ‘neutral, value-free mode of 
scholarly inquiry’, and its approach arguably does not conflict with some of the other 
major areas of critical thought that inform the law, such as critical legal studies and 
feminist jurisprudence.129   
 
And yet, therapeutic jurisprudence has been criticised for possibly entrenching the 
status quo in terms of the operation of the law and criminology.130  Indeed, the term 
‘therapeutic’ might be said to be one that is saturated with implications of social 
control and paternalism.  However, the approach of therapeutic jurisprudence is to 
embrace all forms of scholarly investigation, and to encourage diverse voices and 
applications through an inclusive definition of the philosophy.131  In this way 
therapeutic jurisprudence may allow previously unacceptable approaches to the law, 
and mediation, (for example, those grounded in therapeutic concern and emotion), to 
become more acceptable to government policy makers and courts. 
 
Alternative models of mediation found in ‘second-generation practice’, can be 
strongly associated with the concern found in therapeutic jurisprudence for the 
normative orientation of the emotional and psychological well-being, and the 
promotion of positive therapeutic objectives for the parties.132  With a grounding in 
therapeutic jurisprudence mediation can unapologetically aim to ‘maximise its 
therapeutic affects and minimise its anti-therapeutic affects.’133
 
Importantly for our thesis, therapeutic objectives do not sit compatibly with the notion 
of a neutral third party.  Indeed, adoption of a therapeutic jurisprudence framework 
requires acceptance of an active, engaged, involved and participatory third-party in 
the story of the mediation.134  Therapeutic jurisprudence in fact can be seen as 
creating an imperative for mediation to ‘create the most beneficial and emotionally 
satisfying solution for a particular client’s interests and unique circumstances.’135    If 
the mediator abandons neutrality and involves themselves more actively, mediation 
may ‘have excellent therapeutic effects for the client.’136  In particular, second-
generation practice models, and their critical stance in relation to neutrality, 
demonstrate clear links to the potential of the discourse of therapeutic jurisprudence.  
 
                                                 
128  Winnick and Wexler above note 12 at 7. 
129 B Winnick, ‘The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ (1997) 3 Psychology Public Policy 
and Law 184 at 188. 
130 B Arrigo, ‘The Ethics of Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Critical and Theoretical Enquiry of Law, 
Psychology and Crime’ (2004) 11 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 23. 
131 The term has been described as a “flexible heuristic” by McMahon and Wexler above note 124 at 1. 
132   Drawing on Wexler above note 10 at 8 where he is talking about the law more generally. 
133   Wexler above note 10 at 14. 
134  Winnick and Wexler above note 12. 
135   Schneider above note 125 at 3. 
136   Schneider above note 125 at 6. 
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The key areas of positive connection are numerous, six will be discussed here.137  
These areas of connection demonstrate the scope of therapeutic jurisprudence to 
provide the legitimising foundation to mediation that has previously been found in the 
concept of neutrality.   
 
The first area, importantly, is that therapeutic jurisprudence allows for mediators to 
acknowledge that mediation is ‘an interpersonal and affective activity.’138   A key 
value of mediation can in fact be said to derive from this quality ‘because a broad 
range of issues can be addressed in contrast to the more narrow scope of issues that 
are dealt with in litigation,’139 and this ‘makes the mediation process even more 
therapeutic and beneficial to the client.’140  For example, ‘often the mere ability to be 
heard and to tell their story is cathartic’ for parties in dispute.141  The integration of 
the parties’ stories into the negotiations by the mediator is a non-neutral and 
participative process, which therapeutic jurisprudence justifies by taking an holistic 
approach to achieving a just and appropriate outcome for the parties.  Additionally, 
‘the opportunity to sit across from the person whom the client perceives as having 
wronged him or her has been shown as helpful in moving past the dispute and 
productively working toward the future.’142  The mediator’s work with that dynamic 
is inherently non-neutral, but is affirmed by the fact that a therapeutic jurisprudential 
basis to their actions values their integrated participation in this way.  Also, apologies 
are a therapeutic aspect of mediation,143 but by encouraging an apology a mediator is 
acting in an inherently non-neutral way.  The concept of therapeutic jurisprudence 
supports this approach. 
 
A second positive connection between mediation and therapeutic jurisprudence can be 
found in the focus offered by therapeutic jurisprudence on an interdisciplinary and 
cross-jurisdictional orientation.144  ‘Insights from the social and behavioural sciences 
– especially psychology, psychiatry, criminology and social work – are routinely 
employed in studies conducted within the therapeutic jurisprudence framework.’145  
Similarly, mediation has been an area of practice that has been informed by diverse 
disciplines such as psychology, social work and law.146 Mediation research in this 
country has tended to focus on the analysis of disputes which are, or might otherwise 
be, the subject of litigation.  For example, in an attempt to assess whether mediation is 
cheaper and quicker than going to court, evaluations have been conducted of court-
connected mediation.  Similarly, attempts have been made to ascertain client 
                                                 
137   These key areas have been developed from the introduction to the special issue of Law in Context 
focussed on therapeutic jurisprudence: McMahon and Wexler above note 124 at 1. 
138   McMahon and Wexler above note 124.  
139   Schneider above note 125 at 6. 
140   Schneider above note 125 at 6. 
141  Schneider above note 125 at 6 referring to Chris Guthrie and James Levin, ‘A “Party Satisfaction” 
Perspective on a Comprehensive Mediation Statute’ (1998) 13 Ohio St Journal on Dispute Resolution 
235; Robert A Baruch Bush, ‘What Do We Need Mediation For?’(1996) 12 Ohio St Journal on 
Dispute Resolution. Page?; and Barbara Mc Adoo and Nancy Welsh, ‘Does ADR Really Have a Place 
on the Lawyer’s Philosophical Map? (1997) 18 Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 376. 
142   Schneider above note 125.. 
143   Ibid at 6 referring to Jonathan R Cohen ‘Advising Clients to Apologize’ (1999) 72 S California 
Law Review 1009. 
144   McMahon and Wexler above note 124 at 2. 
145   Ibid. 
146  Mayer above note 8 at 18.  
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satisfaction with the process.147  A wider research agenda is now being encouraged148 
that the discourse of therapeutic jurisprudence might support.  
 
A third positive connection lies in focusing on mediation in action.149  That is, 
therapeutic jurisprudence encourages consideration of the actual processes of 
mediation and its evolution, and discourages abstract considerations of mediation 
practice – as might be found in mythical notions of neutrality.  This allows mediators 
to be ‘mindful of the need to be aware of the unintended consequences’ of their 
activities and to think more reflectively about what they do ‘as well as different and 
better ways of doing those things.’150   
 
A fourth positive connection between mediation and therapeutic jurisprudence lies in 
the promotion of an ethic of care.151  This idea has resonance with many feminist 
writers and their critique of mediation.152  Many of their concerns regarding problem-
solving models can be linked to the mirroring of the litigious process and the notions 
inherent in a focus upon rights.  An ethic of care approach can be promoted in 
mediation through connecting with therapeutic jurisprudence and thereby arguably 
meeting some of the concerns feminists have expressed. 
 
A fifth positive connection lies in the support offered through the therapeutic 
jurisprudence framework for the adoption of multiple perspectives in understanding 
mediation as an important dispute resolution option for parties.153  This approach is 
borne out by the contribution to mediation theory of the aforementioned diverse 
disciplines, but importantly the framework of therapeutic jurisprudence would 
discourage the dominance of one discipline area over others in mediation practice.154
 
A sixth positive connection is in the area of adopting an optimistic agenda for 
reform.155  Mediation has been hailed as the saviour of our legal system in that it has 
been seen to provide a true alternative to litigation.  Many critics of the process have 
articulated serious concerns, which should not be taken lightly, regarding the truth of 
this assertion.156  Despite these concerns, however, the potential of mediation to 
provide a unique, alternative and positive option in dispute resolution remains very 
real.  There are both public and private benefits to the widespread use of mediation in 
our society.  The opportunity exists, for example, through mediation to entirely 
                                                 
147  T Sourdin, Alternative Dispute Resolution NSW: Thomson LawBook Co (2nd ed. 2005). 
148  See for example National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, ADR Research: A 
Resource Paper Canberra (2004). 
149 McMahon and Wexler above note 124 at 3. 
150  Ibid. 
151  Ibid; and see also D Stolle, David Wexler and B Winick (eds) (2000) Practising Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence: Law as a Helping Profession Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press; and BJ Winick 
and David Wexler (eds) (2003) Judging in a Therapeutic Key: Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the 
Courts Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. 
152 See for a summary of feminist concerns Astor and Chinkin above note 1 at 128-134. 
153   McMahon and Wexler above note 124 at 3-4. 
154 For example Mayer warns of the prospect of the field of conflict resolution being absorbed into the 
field of law.  The approach of therapeutic jurisprudence may guard against this trend, see Mayer above 
note 8 at 7. 
155   McMahon and Wexler above note 124 at 4. 
156 For example concerns relating to the privatising of disputes, the special needs of certain groups such 
as Indigenous communities and the reduction in the establishment of important precedents, see Astor 
and Chinkin above note 1 at 9-10. 
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transform the way that citizens deal with conflict.  As Bush and Folger have said, 
‘personal experiences that reinforce the civic virtues of self-determination and mutual 
consideration are of enormous public value - and this is precisely what the process of 
conflict transformation provides.’157  Similarly, therapeutic jurisprudence provides the 
framework for an optimistic agenda for reform in terms of the way we deal with 
conflict and the way in which we promote policy change in the legal and justice 
systems and more widely in society. 
 
Clearly, the second-generation mediation models of storytelling, narrative and 
transformation fit within the six elements of positive connection between mediation 
and therapeutic jurisprudence philosophy outlined above.  Each model, like 
therapeutic jurisprudence, deals with emotion and relationships and has a focus on 
more than individual issues.  These models consider the wider community and also 
the social impact of dispute resolution.158   Mediation, through these models, has the 
potential to be known for its therapeutic effect, especially through the incorporation of 
storytelling.159  Further, and more pragmatically, a therapeutic connection can be 
established in that, as a timely and efficient process, mediation has a therapeutic 
benefit of being able to ‘clearly alleviate stress in clients on both sides of the dispute, 
and allow clients to move forward.’160  
 
Another area of interest pursued by scholars of therapeutic jurisprudence is the 
psychology of procedural justice.  Research has shown that a sense of being involved 
in a fair process that is conducted in good faith and that treats participants with 
dignity and respect affects the overall satisfaction of participants and the likelihood 
that they will comply with the outcome.  In particular, participants seem to value 
telling their story and being listened to by an authority figure.161  Procedural justice 
has been explored by a number of writers in the mediation area.162  Some have argued 
that particular forms of mediation do not provide a psychological outcome most 
preferred by parties.163  In relation to court-connected mediation in particular, where 
there has been a drift to evaluative models, there has been criticism of the parties 
experiences that often involve a process that is dominated by lawyers and shuttle 
negotiation techniques.164   
 
In the context of our discussion of neutrality there may be an argument that second 
generation practice models do not satisfy parties because of the express absence of 
                                                 
157 Bush and Folger above note 22 at 82. 
158  Paquin and Harvey above note 126. 
159  Ibid. 
160   Schneider above note 125 at 6. 
161 Winnick and Wexler describe this concept as follows: ‘The literature on the psychology of 
procedural justice, based on empirical work in a variety of litigation and arbitration contexts, shows 
that if people are treated with dignity and respect at hearings, given a sense of “voice,” the ability to tell 
their story, and “validation,” the feeling that what they have said has been taken seriously by the judge 
or hearing officer, they will experience greater satisfaction and comply more willingly with the 
ultimate outcome of the proceedings, even if adverse to them’,  see Winnick and Wexler above note 12 
at 129. 
162 See for example Mayer above note 8 at 23-28; and note that Boulle identifies procedural justice as 
an attribute of facilitative mediation, above note 2 at 44. 
163 D Hensler, ‘Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology’ (2002) Journal of Dispute 
Resolution 81.  
164 N Welsh, ‘Making Deals in Court-Connected mediation: What’s Justice Got To Do With It?’ (2001) 
79 Washington University Law Quarterly 787. 
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neutrality may lead to a sense of a consequent lack of procedural justice.  That is, 
parties may not feel that the process is conducted in good faith if the mediator does 
not describe him or herself as neutral.  However, we believe that participants may still 
experience psychological satisfaction if mediators ensure that they are even-handed in 
their approach. 165  For example, with regard to narrative mediation the authors of this 
approach highlight the importance of carrying out mediator interventions in a manner 
that does not alienate either party.166  We would argue that the term ‘neutrality’ is not 
required to ensure that participants experience a procedurally just process, and that we 
can turn to the therapeutic framework to provide the foundation for any requisite 
sense of even-handedness. 
 
Whilst the connections between therapeutic jurisprudence and second generation 
mediation practice are clear, it is important to note that at present these models are not 
widely practised in Australia,167 although the transformative model has had some 
success in the USA.168  Therefore, whilst the framework of therapeutic jurisprudence 
may assist to legitimise some of these more contentious models of mediation, in order 
for the mediation profession truly to move forward, and away from the rhetoric of 
neutrality, there is a need for second-generation models of mediation to be more 
widely accepted by the community, practitioners, courts and government.  Utilisation 
of the therapeutic jurisprudence framework may allow courts and governments to see 
mediation practice in a way that does not rely upon neutrality, but as having value due 
to the legitimising nature of the therapeutic jurisprudence discourse. 
 
It is also important to ask whether therapeutic jurisprudence is useful to problem-
solving models of mediation.  We believe that positive connections and benefits are 
possible in relation to the facilitative model of mediation.  For example, the adoption 
of the therapeutic jurisprudence framework may allow facilitative mediation to 
distance itself from the neutrality banner and help it to evolve out of the emphasis on 
settlement.  There is also the intriguing opportunity to use the therapeutic 
jurisprudence framework to encourage practitioners of the facilitative model to 
analyse emotion and relationships in a more sophisticated manner and to see these 
concerns as a priority in the mediation.   
 
It should be acknowledged that in fact some writings regarding therapeutic 
jurisprudence include reference to facilitative models of mediation,169 and that 
problem solving is a common connector in terms of, for example, therapeutic 
jurisprudence being closely associated with problem-solving courts.  We suggest 
                                                 
165 As we noted above there is sometimes now a distinction made between the terms impartiality and 
neutrality, NADRAC above note 48 at 112-113. However, there is a danger that this distinction can 
lead to confusion as many regard the terms to be synonymous, for example, mediators or parties may 
interpret neutrality as impartiality, see for a discussion of this concern Cobb and Rifkin above note 3 at 
42. 
166 For example the narrative mediation approach values the opportunity private meetings provide to 
build rapport with a party.  Building rapport would be a more difficult task to achieve where both 
parties are present as it might be seen as excessively warm to one party over another, see Winslade and 
Monk above note 21 at 137 to 140.  When speaking of the need to deal with one parties exaggerated 
sense of entitlement Winslade and Monk warn of the need to provide assistance in a ‘… manner that 
does not alienate the party who appears to be the most advantaged as the mediation begins’, see 
Winslade and Monk above note 21 at 101. 
167  Boulle above note 2 at 47. 
168  Bush and Folger above note 22 at 99. 
169  See for example Wexler above note 10 at 100. 
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therefore that the issue of the problematic juxtaposition of neutrality and problem 
solving mediation170 can find beneficial resolution through the therapeutic 
jurisprudence approach.   
 
Caution is also warranted in terms of the adoption of this theory as the basis for a new 
approach to mediation, however, at least to some extent.  That is, whilst ‘mediation 
might be following therapeutic jurisprudence principles, the actors in mediation might 
not be.’171  As Schneider has said, ‘when lawyers have not become part of the 
therapeutic solution, they can clearly become part of the problem.  If clients are 
counselled not to really participate in the mediation, mediation can lose much of its 
potential therapeutic advantage.  If courts require attendance at mediation with 
unwilling parties, the mediation can just serve to aggravate the parties further prior to 
what may be an inevitable trial.’172
 
The mediation process, then, from a therapeutic perspective, can also be abused.173  
Indeed, few jurisdictions require good faith mediation, and ‘mediations can be used as 
fishing expeditions for free discovery, can be used by one side to test the witness’ 
ability and can be used solely to cost the other side time and money.’174  These issues 
require us to take some care when thinking about the therapeutic possibilities of 
mediation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our argument in this article has been that therapeutic jurisprudence, a new concept in 
the legal discourse allowing for an interdisciplinary approach that incorporates the 
emotional impact of the law, can provide the legitimising framework for mediation 
previously found in the attribute of neutrality.  To open up the benefits of the 
therapeutic perspective, however, it is necessary for mediators to be prepared to 
acknowledge that neutrality is not possible and that new models of mediation should 
be adopted that do not rely on neutrality for legitimacy.  
 
Therapeutic jurisprudence has entered the legal discourse.  It provides a framework 
for significant innovative change in our justice system in general and in the practice of 
mediation more particularly.  It can also provide the framework for a shift from the 
neutral mediator in first generation practice of mediation to the more reflective, 
interactive, involved mediator of second generation practice.  Mediation practice has 
reached a level of maturity where it is better able now to adopt alternative approaches.  
These approaches mean that the profession no longer needs to rely on the crutch of 
neutrality.  Rather, with therapeutic jurisprudence as a foundation it is possible to 
encourage a practice of mediation that is innovative, and values emotion, relationships 
and the community. 
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